The San Francisco Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety (CAPSS), among other tasks, addressed the threat that regional earthquakes pose to 4,400 older, soft-story, highoccupancy woodframe residential buildings, like the apartment buildings that collapsed in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. They house 8% of the city's population, in a city with a rental vacancy rate near 3%. A risk analysis was performed to estimate their postearthquake safety and repair costs under 4 scenarios and 4 what-if conditions. We used a method related to HAZUS-MH, but using detailed characteristics of 4 index buildings that served as proxies for the broader population. Post-earthquake safety was characterized in terms of ATC-20 (Applied Technology Council 1989 et seq.) tag color, plus a collapsed/not collapsed metric. Results were peer reviewed by respected engineers who added their own judgment. Results were presented to approximately 80 self-selected stakeholders, including tenants, owners, and other parties. The stakeholders identified, discussed, and selected policy recommendations that included a City ordinance for mandatory retrofit. It seems likely that the City will enact such an ordinance. If that outcome is deemed "success," we attribute it to four factors that might be emulated elsewhere. First, these buildings probably do represent a leading threat to the City's viability. The memory of the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake and photographs of similar damage in 1906 are evidence of a real, ongoing threat. Second, the risk estimate focused on an important community value: safety tag color, rather than repair cost (though we presented both). Third, while acknowledging the many uncertainties involved, we limited our discussion of probabilities, focusing instead on realistic outcomes of a few realistic earthquakes that could occur any day, and certainly will occur eventually. Fourth, we made no policy recommendations, allowing the public (through the stakeholder committee) to determine what they thought was best for them and for the City.
INTRODUCTION
The San Francisco Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety (CAPSS) is a project of the San Francisco Department of Building Inspection (DBI). CAPSS was created to inform policy decisions and actions by DBI and other city agencies and policymakers for reducing earthquake risks in existing, privately-owned buildings that are regulated by DBI. It also aimed to produce repair and rebuilding guidelines to expedite recovery after an earthquake. A CAPSS study was completed in 2003, but remained unpublished until the retirement of a combatant in an unrelated political rivalry. The project was restarted in 2006, and received an additional impetus when a leading San Francisco engineer (Pat Buscovitch) was quoted in the local newspaper (Selna 2008 ) discussing the danger posed by soft-story woodframe buildings, like those that experienced severe damage in the San Francisco Marina District in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake. He said, "Almost every apartment building in the Sunset District and the Richmond District with ground-floor grocery stores and shops. ... They're toast! They'll kill a lot of people." A week later, Mayor Gavin Newsom issued Executive Directive 08-07 calling for DBI to expedite the study of soft-story buildings under CAPSS. The directive called for DBI to produce retrofit guidelines, waive related fees, produce an outreach campaign, and create an emergency planning exercise. This manuscript describes an engineering risk study of those buildings. Details of the study can be found in ATC (2010) , Porter and Cobeen (2009) and Porter (2009a-c) .
CHARACTERIZING AND INVENTORYING THE SUBJECT BUILDINGS
To comply with the directive required that DBI first identify the buildings covered by the directive. DBI focused its soft-story efforts on high-occupancy buildings with a woodframed 1 st story, with 5 or more housing units, 3 or more stories, built before 1979. DBI possessed data indicating the addresses of 4,300 buildings that met these conditions, but not information about which ones had soft stories. Identifying those posed a challenge: According to ASCE 7-10 (American Society of Civil Engineers 2010), a "Stiffness-soft story irregularity" is deemed to exist where "there is a story in which the lateral stiffness is less than 70% of that in the story above or less than 80% of the average stiffness of the three stories above." A weak story is deemed to exist "Where the story lateral strength is less than 80% of that in the story above." However, to determine whether any given building strictly meets either criterion requires a structural analysis to determine story strengths and stiffnesses-a costly proposition.
DBI organized a survey of the candidate buildings to determine whether they were on a corner lot, on a sloped site, and the degree of openness on each visible side. As a proxy or indicator of possible soft-story conditions, DBI and CAPSS researchers defined a possible soft-story woodframe building within the candidate buildings as one having at least 80% openness on one ground-story façade or at least 50% along two facades. These criteria could be readily observed from the street during the survey. A total of 2,830 buildings met all the criteria for inclusion in the study. They contain approximately 29,000 housing units, measure approximately 25 million square feet in gross area, and using a reasonable estimate of square-foot replacement cost for San Francisco, would cost on the order of $14 billion to replace, including contents. They represent approximately 7% of the total housing units in San Francisco and house 8% of the city's population, in a city with a rental vacancy rate near 3%.
BUILDINGS AT RISK
A risk analysis was performed to estimate the post-earthquake safety and repair costs or these buildings under 4 scenario earthquakes and 4 what-if conditions. It was impractical to perform a risk analysis considering the configuration and structural characteristics of each building. We judged that that the most structurally important features were (a) whether the building stood on a corner lot (and therefore lacked the support of adjacent buildings on either side in 2 directions); (b) if so, degree of openness in each direction; and (c) era of construction.
We deemed it reasonable for present purposes to idealize the actual building stock with 4 so-called index buildings, shown in Figure 1 , which served as proxies for the broader population. Corner buildings that were at least 80% open on one side were represented by index building 1. Corner buildings that did not meet the criteria for index building 1, but that were at least 50% open on 2 sides, were represented by index building 2. Mid-block buildings built before 1950 were represented by index building 3; post-1950 mid-block buildings were represented by index building 4.
(1) 
mid-block, 4 story, pre-WWII, neighbors on both sides; (4) mid-block, 3 story, post-1950, neighbors on both sides. Square footage is 3,600, 5,800, 2,300, and 1,800 sf, respectively.
RETROFIT ALTERNATIVES
Four retrofit alternatives were considered for each building. The first was to do nothing, and leave these buildings as-is. Retrofit option 1 included the addition of structural sheathing at ground-story walls with inadequate bracing length. The performance goal was to provide a reasonable assurance that the building would be safe, though perhaps not repairable, after a major earthquake. Retrofit 2 added steel frames at garage openings. The performance objective was to provide reasonable assurance that the building would be safe and usable after repair. Retrofit 3 was like 2, but using cantilever columns designed to resist the same seismic forces as the steel frames, with a lower R factor. This option aimed to provide reasonable assurance that the building would be safe and usable after repair, and possibly during repair.
In the language of SPUR, (2008), these are performance objectives D, C, and B, respectively. A schematic design of each index building and retrofit alternative was developed, including building geometry, masses, material strengths and stiffnesses. Table  1 shows the estimated costs of the retrofits; Figure 2 illustrates one of the retrofits. See Porter and Cobeen (2009) or Applied Technology Council (2010) for details. 
VULNERABILITY OF INDEX BUILDINGS
To assess the risk to these buildings, we used a method related to HAZUS-MH, but employing the detailed characteristics of 4 index buildings that served as proxies for the broader population. We briefly summarize the HAZUS-MH method for the reader who is unfamiliar with it.
For structural analysis, HAZUS-MH employs the capacity-spectrum method of structural analysis, a pseudostatic nonlinear procedure that idealizes a building as a single-degreeof-freedom harmonic oscillator with a 3-part pushover curve in the space of force and displacement: a linear portion with constant stiffness and damping ratio; a softening portion with decreasing stiffness and increasing hysteretic damping formed as a portion of an ellipse, and a perfectly plastic portion with zero tangent stiffness and increasing hysteretic damping. The pushover curve in the force and deformation space is mapped to a pushover curve in the space of spectral acceleration response and spectral displacement response, respectively, with effective damping ratio as an implicit 3 rd dimension of structural response. Seismic excitation in any given earthquake is characterized with an idealized response spectrum in the same space, parameterized by damped elastic spectral acceleration response at 0.3 second period (denoted here by SA03) and at 1.0-second period (denoted here by SA10), at various damping ratios. The structural response of a particular building to a particular earthquake-the performance point-is estimated as the point where the pushover curve intersects the idealized response spectrum and both have the same effective damping ratio. Damage is then estimated by first idealizing the building as comprising 3 parts: a structural, drift-sensitive component, a nonstructural, drift-sensitive portion, and a nonstructural acceleration-sensitive portion. The damageability of each component is defined by four fragility functions that take on the form of a cumulative lognormal distribution function, one for each of four damage states named slight, moderate, extensive and complete. (Collapse is treated as a subset of the complete structural damage state). The damage states are described qualitatively by descriptions of the terms of the physical damage to each component at each state; these vary by structure type. The structural damage states are related to ATC-20 post-earthquake safety tag colors by equating the descriptions of damage in HAZUS-MH to the descriptions in ATC-20, making the HAZUS-MH complete structural damage state equate with red tagging, extensive structural damage with a yellow tag, and anything less as resulting in a green tag.
Each damage state for each component is also associated with an estimate of the associated cost to restore the component to the undamaged state, and so by applying the theorem of total probability, one can estimate the expected value of repair cost for a given building subjected to a particular seismic excitation. By repeating the process at many levels of excitation, one can construct a vulnerability function to relate excitation to repair cost. See for example Porter (2009a) for details, especially for a method to perform the structural analysis without iterating to find the performance point where the effective damping of the pushover and response spectrum match.
To apply this methodology to the CAPSS index buildings, we created pushover curves for each index building and retrofit, and new fragility functions for the particular building components of which our index buildings were made. In particular these were straight wood exterior sheathing, lath and plaster interior finishes, brick veneer, stucco exterior finish, and the spectral displacement at which buildings of this type collapse. We used laboratory test data and earthquake experience to establish these fragility functions. We omit the details here, and merely provide the resulting fragility functions that relate redtag probability to 1-second 5%-damped spectral acceleration response. The interested reader is referred to Porter (2009b, c) for detailed derivation of these curves, as well as the component fragility functions, which relate structural response to component damage states, and seismic vulnerability functions, which relate shaking intensity to building repair cost as a fraction of replacement cost new. 
RISK ASSESSMENT
The models of the index buildings were subjected to 4 hypothetical but highly realistic future earthquakes: an M7.9 rupture of the San Andreas Fault (similar to the 1906 earthquake), an M7.2 rupture of a shorter segment of the fault near San Francisco, an M6.5 rupture of the San Andreas Fault, and an M6.9 rupture of the Hayward Fault. Shaking in each event, estimated by Golesorkhi and Gouchon (2002) , is illustrated in Figure 5 . The location of each of the 2,800 real buildings was determined from its address, and the shaking intensity in each scenario determined using the Golesorkhi and Gouchon (2002) maps. The estimated ATC-20 safety tag color and repair cost was then estimated using the fragility and vulnerability functions for the appropriate index building. The results were summed, producing the figures shown in Error! Reference source not found.. Figure 6 illustrates the estimate tag colors for each building, under the M7.2 earthquake scenario and as-is conditions. Results for the other scenarios were also calculated. We focus here on the M7.2 event. It is a highly likely-actually inevitable, not-worst-caseearthquake. The table suggests that in an earthquake that could happen tomorrow, the following could occur:
• 8 in 10 buildings could be red tagged, of which 2 collapse • Retrofit could reduce red tags to 1 in 10, collapse to 1 in 200 • Such a retrofit could cost on the order of $16,000 per housing unit, roughly equivalent to the cost of a modest bathroom renovation • After retrofit, many buildings would require substantial repair, but on average at lower cost than retrofit
POLICYMAKING
These results for the M7.2 and the other 3 scenarios were presented to the CAPSS Advisory Committee: a group of approximately 80 self-selected stakeholders, including tenants, owners, and other parties. As of this writing, the Committee has met approximately 30 times; the presentation mentioned here occurred during their 8 th meeting, at a workshop convened by DBI on 10 December 2008. The stakeholders were also presented with demographic studies of the economic and cultural status of the people occupying these buildings. The engineers who performed the risk analysis did not offer any policy recommendations of other normative interpretation of the results, merely the results of the analyses that we expected to be relevant to the policy decisions.
The CAPSS Advisory Committee members stakeholders identified, discussed, and selected policy recommendations. They first discussed whether these were the right buildings to focus on first, deciding that yes they were, while recognizing that there were other vulnerable buildings. There was general agreement that a retrofit ordinance was needed that would ensure that 95% of the occupants of the study buildings could shelter in place after a major earthquake. They felt that the fatality risk was sufficiently addressed by reducing the collapse potential of the subject buildings to meeting the 95% shelter-in-place objective. There was broad consensus in favor of a mandatory retrofit program (as opposed to a voluntary one). The participants considered that seismic risk represented "a community issue that outweighs individual concerns" of property owners who would have to pay for the retrofit work. They decided that the priority for a retrofit program should be an initial focus on the large corner buildings, especially those on softer soil. The participants also recommended the City help to finance the retrofit through low-cost loans, general obligation bonds, and DBI fee rebates. They accepted that costs should be passed through costs to tenants, even in rent controlled buildings.
Actual adoption of the CAPSS Advisory Committee's recommendations is still in process. Before the end of the project, Mayor Gavin Newsom was elected California Lieutenant Governor, and although he continued in 2009 to advocate in favor of a mandatory retrofit ordinance, the attention of the Board of Supervisors turned to succession, the election of a new mayor. In March 2010, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a voluntary retrofit ordinance 54-10 that included modest incentives, but has proven ineffective. Fewer retrofits were performed in the year after the ordinance than in the year before (26 the year after, versus 40 the year before). In November 2010, Measure A, a bond to pay for the retrofit of most-vulnerable buildings failed, with 64% of voters favoring the bond (67% required).
The current Mayor, Ed Lee, called for the completion of the rest of the CAPSS program and the drafting of a program to deal with all of the seismic risk issues raised by the project, before further acting on a mandatory ordinance for the retrofit of soft-story buildings. In September 2011, the City's new Earthquake Safety Implementation Committee produced a draft Earthquake Safety Implementation Program Workplan (Kornfield et al. 2011) , in 3 phases covering tasks to be undertaken during the next 30 years. The draft program, among other things, calls for "Mandatory evaluation of wood frame residential buildings with three or more dwelling units upon sale and with a fixed deadline," and "Mandatory evaluation and retrofit of 3+ story, 5+ unit soft-story wood frame residential buildings," to be completed by 2024.
CONCLUSIONS
A study was performed of a particularly vulnerable portion of the San Francisco housing stock: high-occupancy, soft-story woodframe dwellings similar to those that collapsed in the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake, most notably in the San Francisco Marina District. The study was part of the Community Action Plan for Seismic Safety (CAPSS). CAPSS was a community-driven effort led by the San Francisco Department of Building Inspection, partly under the impetus of the mayor, Gavin Newsom, partly in response to safety concerns voiced by a leading structural engineer and amplified by the local newspaper. CAPSS had substantial leadership and decision-making participation from approximately 80 self-selected community volunteers and stakeholders in the buildings at risk who formed the CAPSS Advisory Committee. The CAPSS Advisory Committee was involved throughout the project, meeting 30 times. Ultimately the CAPSS Advisory Committee recommended the adoption of an ordinance requiring mandatory retrofit of the subject buildings. The recommendation was ultimately encoded along with others in a policy implementation document, the Earthquake Safety Implementation Program Workplan (Kornfield et al. 2011) . If the Workplan is adopted, we would consider that to be a successful outcome of the soft-story study. We attribute that success to four factors that might be emulated elsewhere.
• First, these buildings probably do represent a leading threat to the City's viability. The memory of the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake and photographs of similar damage in 1906 are evidence of a real, ongoing threat.
• Second, the estimates of risk focused on an important community value: safety tag color, rather than repair cost (though we presented both).
• Third, while acknowledging the many uncertainties involved, we limited our discussion of probabilities, focusing instead on realistic outcomes of a few realistic earthquakes that could occur any day, and certainly will occur eventually.
• Fourth, we made no policy recommendations, allowing the public (through the CAPSS Advisory Committee) to determine what they thought was best for them and for the City.
